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A NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY PROCESS FOR THE FUTURE

by

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**A National Military Strategy Process for the Future**

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The purpose of this study is to examine the process used to develop the National Military Strategy and evaluate the effectiveness of the process for long-range planning. The paper reviews the strategy formulation process in a democratic society and then considers the regulations and policies developed since 1986 that govern the process. With that background, the study evaluates the system using the most recently published National Military Strategy, which resulted in the Base Force, and the defense strategy contained in the Bottom-Up Review. This examination reveals the difficulty of developing and implementing a long-range strategic vision. Finally, a review of the status of development of the present National Military Strategy serves to analyze progress made within the system. This review does not assess the strategies themselves. It discusses substantive content minimally and only for the purpose of analyzing the formulation process. The study focuses on how effective the Joint Strategic Planning System is in producing a long range military strategy. The study concludes with recommendations to improve the process.

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## **ABSTRACT**

**AUTHOR:** Don T. Riley

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The purpose of this study is to examine the process used to develop the National Military Strategy and evaluate the effectiveness of the process for long range planning. In 1986, both the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management and the Congress found weaknesses in the Joint Staff strategic planning process. The President, the Congress, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff subsequently directed changes in the system to improve long range planning. Yet with all the revisions of the Joint Strategic Planning System, indications are that long range planning remains weak. The paper reviews the strategy formulation process in a democratic society and then considers the regulations and policies developed since 1986 that govern the process. With that background, the study evaluates the system using the most recently published National Military Strategy, which resulted in the Base Force, and the defense strategy contained in the Bottom-Up Review. This examination reveals the difficulty of developing and implementing a long range strategic vision. Finally, a review of the status of development of the present National Military Strategy serves to analyze progress made within the system. This review does not assess the strategies themselves. It discusses substantive content minimally and only for the purpose of analyzing the formulation process. The study focuses on how effective the Joint Strategic Planning System is in producing a long range military strategy. The study concludes with recommendations to improve the process.

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1	Joint Strategic Planning System Interfaces .....	12
Figure 2	Methodology of the Bottom-Up Review .....	19

## **Introduction**

Until relatively recently, the United States Government has not attempted to codify a national security strategy nor has the Department of Defense published a document entitled National Military Strategy. Certainly, the government has developed security policies for using the elements of national power. In June, 1986 the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management chaired by David Packard recommended the preparation of "a comprehensive statement of national security objectives and priorities based on recommendations of the National Security Council (NSC)." Additionally, the Packard Commission recommended the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) "prepare a military strategy for the national objectives."<sup>1</sup> National Security Decision Directive 219, implemented these recommendations.<sup>2</sup> Then, President Reagan's 1988 report to Congress clearly delineated national security guidance and objectives. The thrust of the Commission's recommendations on planning and budgeting was to increase and improve long range national security planning.

However, there are indications that long range military planning still needs major improvement. In a January, 1994 speech the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral David Jeremiah, stated

It is astonishing to reflect that there was no discussion, no theory, no substantive real strategic dialog that contemplated a post-Cold War world and the challenges we would face -- before the end of the Cold War. Nor has there been any strategic dialog about the impact of advanced technology weapons on offensive and, more importantly, defensive warfare. Where was the strategic pull? We've ducked our responsibilities for forty years or so. Now we must rethink our world and our options.<sup>3</sup>

Should not the National Military Strategy provide this "strategic pull"? Is the Joint Staff planning system sufficient to develop long range planning and programming guidance?

The purpose of this study is to examine the process used to develop the National Military Strategy (NMS) and evaluate the effectiveness of this process for long range planning. The paper reviews the strategy formulation process in a democratic society and then considers the regulations and policies developed since 1986 that govern the process. With that background, the most recently published military strategy which resulted in the Base Force, and the defense strategy in the Bottom Up Review are used to evaluate the system. Finally, a look at the status of the present NMS development serves to analyze progress made within the system. This review does not assess the strategies themselves. It discusses substantive content minimally and only for the purpose of analyzing the formulation process. The study focuses on how effective



the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) is in producing a long range military strategy. The study concludes with recommendations to improve the process to meet better the intent of those who directed the development of an NMS.

The national military strategy serves two major purposes. First, it provides general guidance for operational planning. The combatant commanders, or Unified Commanders in Chief (CINCs) then carry out the detailed planning. Second, the national military strategy guides force planning and programming. The Services translate this guidance into programs to support the needs of the CINCs. In this way the national military strategy also serves to articulate to Congress a basis for the resource allocation decisions the legislative branch must make.

In today's international climate, a coherent military strategy assumes even greater importance. The complexity of the strategic environment has increased substantially since the end of the Cold War. Threats to national security are now more diffuse and difficult to define. No longer can the military develop a strategy based on a specific threat, for the strategy could become quickly obsolete in ever-changing conditions of regional power balances. Compounding this situation is the priority that domestic issues have assumed in national policy making with

less emphasis on foreign policy and development of a comprehensive national security strategy. These factors result in an ill-defined strategic environment for the military. But even though the conditions facing the military strategist are uncertain, there are no serious near term direct threats to the security of the United States.

These conditions present the military not only with a dilemma, but an opportunity as well. The dilemma is how does the Department of Defense (DoD) bring down the size of the force in this time of reduced threat while still achieving national military objectives? The opportunity is for the military to influence its long term future perhaps more than ever before. The military is now in a period in which it can secure the nation with present forces available while building a force and strategy capable of achieving the long term interests of the nation. This could be a military substantially different from today's. Technology development is progressing rapidly, necessitating a significant leap forward in strategic planning. It now takes ten to twenty years to develop, field, and to become proficient with new doctrine and equipment. Therefore, the process of thinking, forecasting, debating, planning, and programming for the military 20 years from now begins today.

## **Strategy Formulation: The Ideal**

One must understand that military strategy is bound by the policy aims, within a grand strategy, that it seeks to attain. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) define military strategy as the

art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force, or the threat of force.<sup>4</sup>

The national policy objectives are what drive the military strategy. JCS Pub 1 also defines national strategy as the

art and science of developing and using the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives.<sup>5</sup>

This study equates the terms national strategy with both national security strategy and grand strategy. As emphasized by Clausewitz, war is subject to policy, and the statesman's job is to determine the type of war he wishes to undertake.<sup>6</sup> Thus, military strategy is constrained; total victory may not be the end specified. The military strategist is not an independent actor in a strategic security environment in which he can pursue the most favorable military course of action to achieve national security objectives. At the national level, there is no "pure military decision." The economic and political elements of grand strategy also influence military strategy. Within the constraints of a grand strategy,

the only effective measure of a military strategy is the policy aim.

Colonel (Ret) Art Lykke of the U.S Army War College expressed strategy as an equation: "Strategy equals Ends (objectives towards which one strives) plus Ways (courses of action) plus Means (instruments by which some end can be achieved)."<sup>7</sup> The essence of successful strategy formulation is attaining a balance between these ends, ways, and means. Thus, strategy becomes more of an art than a science. The strategist can follow a rational formula, but the balancing act requires the intuitive sense of an artist experienced in conceptual integration, consensus, and compromise.

#### **The Process in a Democratic Society: The Reality**

In the democratic government of the United States, control of the military is purposely diffused. The Constitution specifies the President as the Commander in Chief, but reserves to Congress the power to "raise and support Armies."<sup>8</sup> Efficiency in function was sacrificed for control by the people. In broad terms, the military strategist works within this tripartite environment of the administration (the policy makers who define the ends), the legislature (which allocates the resources, or the means), and the military itself which must develop the strategy (or the ways). This can result in the military finding itself caught in the conflict

between the executive and the legislative, between the directors and the providers. This conflict often manifests itself in contradictory guidance, exacerbating the difficulty of developing a cohesive military strategy integrated within a national grand strategy. More often than not, the result is a lack of policy. As Samuel Huntington observed in his classic study The Soldier and the State when commenting on policy conditions shortly after World War I (in a foreign policy and domestic environment similar in some ways to today), "Frequently the military men found themselves forced to work in a vacuum and to guess the nature of national policy."<sup>9</sup>

In conjunction with this Constitutional complication, national security concerns in peacetime are frequently in conflict with economic priorities. The dilemma is how, with limited resources, to provide for the welfare of the people without taking too much from them to provide for their security? For if the nation is not economically strong, this also is a security risk. The grand strategist has a multiple balancing act of his own. He must employ the political, economic, and military elements of power to achieve not only his international policy aims, but also to achieve the most favorable domestic results. This challenge pressures congressmen to balance the immediate needs of their constituents with

the long term security needs of the nation, frequently resulting in detailed Congressional scrutiny of the military budget. This close examination of the budget as well as budget constraints affect strategy formulation. "To a large extent," Gordon Adams concluded in his monograph The New Politics of the Defense Budget, "the defense budget from FY 86 through FY 93 could be said to have been driven as much, if not more, by fiscal limitations than by a clearly defined threat and strategy."<sup>10</sup> These factors manifest themselves in a focus by military force planners on the near term budget rather than on long range planning.

### **The rules**

In the past eight years Congress has implemented significant changes to the law intended to improve the process of military strategy formulation. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 strengthened the role of the CJCS and specified his role in strategy development. Foremost among its provisions was the designation of the CJCS "as the principal military adviser to the president, the NSC, and the Secretary of Defense (SecDef)."<sup>11</sup> It also made the CJCS responsible for assisting the SecDef and the President in providing for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces. Additionally, the Act made the CJCS responsible, and gave him concomitant authority,

for developing strategic plans and budget proposals. Previously, the services generally wrote plans and budgets; but this was only accomplished after some manner of consensus was reached within an environment where the battle to protect service programs was keen. The results, naturally, were strategies and budgets that all could agree on and frequently represented the lowest common denominator. Goldwater-Nichols therefore created an environment in which the CJCS could direct the development of a military strategy in consonance with national military objectives.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum of Policy (MOP) No. 84 (17th Revision, 24 January 1989) incorporated the Congressional mandates into the JSPS. The intended results of this revised JSPS were to be a military strategy and force capable of achieving the national military objectives.<sup>12</sup> Although MOP 84 improved the process of strategy formulation in the Joint Staff, JSPS still remained a process suited for a relatively stable security environment in which the threat to national security could be clearly defined. The system under MOP 84 "was cumbersome, dependent upon on a myriad of planning documents, and characterized by a step-by-step process of JCS, Joint Staff and Service planners meeting to reach agreement on usually contentious issues."<sup>13</sup>

Several documents specified in MOP 84 are pertinent for later comparison purposes. MOP 84 required the Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning (JIEP) to provide "the baseline intelligence threat assessments for developing the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and the Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD)."<sup>14</sup> The JIEP would look out ten years, providing the basis for the JSCP and the JSPD. For the remaining eight years of this ten year planning period, the JIEP would consider "topically relevant issues and situations with potential impact on U.S. national security policies and objectives."<sup>15</sup> The JSCP provided guidance for near term operational planning and the JSPD detailed the strategy and force structure required to achieve the national military objectives during the mid and long terms. The JSPD guided planning for the defense planning period, which was the six years following the budget year. Additionally, it provided an annex for long range planning: Annex G (Long Range Planning Guidance) which was to examine future threats, challenges, and opportunities and propose future military strategies.<sup>16</sup> Thus, MOP 84 detailed significant requirements for long range planning.

In January 1990, MOP 7 superseded MOP 84. The Joint Staff subsequently revised MOP 7 in March 93 and this is the latest version of the JSPS. It simplifies the process of strategy formulation and is



designed to "make the JSPS more responsive to the needs of the Chairman, other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCs, and National Command Authorities in a rapidly changing national security environment."<sup>17</sup> The JSPS changes pertinent to this study are the requirements for developing a national military strategy, the establishment of a Joint Planning Document (JPD) for CJCS programming advice in support of the NMS, flexibility to publish a Chairman's Guidance or simply endorse the Joint Strategy Review (JSR), and emphasis on long range planning.<sup>18</sup> Figure 1 summarizes the JSPS and shows how it interfaces with programming activities.

MOP 7 presently requires only two long range planning documents as part of the JSPS -- the JSR Annual Report and the Joint Planning Document (JPD). The intent of the JSR is to make an assessment "for issues and factors that affect the NMS in the near-term or the long range."<sup>19</sup> One of the three documents produced by the JSR is the Long Range Vision Paper, "published when needed."<sup>20</sup> MOP 7 requires JPD Volume 4, Future Capabilities to address future deficiencies and opportunities out to 20 years and establish a priority listing of research and development (R & D) and science and technology (S & T) objectives.<sup>21</sup> Yet, in some aspects, the current JSPS does not require as much in the area of long range planning




FIGURE 1 -- JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM INTERFACES 22

as previously dictated. In addition to examining future trends, environments, and opportunities, MOP 84 required proposed military strategies for meeting future national security needs. MOP 7 does not

require a strategy to guide the military to the long term future.

The Chairman's Guidance and a separate NMS, however, can greatly assist the process of developing a long term strategy and articulating it to the Secretary of Defense, CINCs, Services, and Congress. With the authority of the Chairman now unquestioned, his strategic vision, developed in concert with or as a result of the JSR, should drive the development of the NMS. The NMS is "designed to assist the Secretary of Defense in the preparation of the DPG (Defense Planning Guidance) and to guide the development of the JSCP."<sup>23</sup> (The DPG is the SecDef's "statement of policy, strategy, forces, resources, and fiscal guidance outlining defense long-range goals and midrange objectives and policies. It provides guidance to the services as a basis for program development."<sup>24</sup>) Although the DPG contains long range goals, there is no requirement for the NMS itself to present a long range strategy. A review of the most recent national military strategies reveals the difficulties of developing long range strategies.

### **The Strategies**

In early 1989, General Colin Powell, then CINC U.S. Forces Command, foresaw that the dissolution of the Soviet Union would dramatically change the strategic security environment and thus require a major shift

in strategic planning. Upon becoming CJCS in October 1989 he directed the development of a strategy and force structure (later termed the Base Force) to respond to regional and contingency needs vice global war with the Soviet Union. He realized that Congress would seek cuts in the Defense budget, and he wanted to ensure he had a viable strategy for achieving national military objectives within a constrained budget. General Powell became Chairman realizing the inadequacies of the present system.<sup>25</sup> He had a clear vision of the future and he wanted to proceed quickly to develop the strategy to implement it.<sup>26</sup>

Over a year elapsed, however, before General Powell gained the support required to implement a new strategy to manage the new international environment which he projected for 1994. He had to overcome the Cold War mind set in which military strategy was viewed in terms of the Soviet threat. Several CINCs were receptive to his vision, but the toughest policy makers to convince were Secretary of Defense Cheney and Mr Paul Wolfowitz, Chairman of the DoD National Strategy Review (NSR) 12 Steering Committee. In January 1990, both remained unconvinced of the reduced threat of the Soviet Union.<sup>27</sup> With the exception of General Gray, Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Powell was able to convince the Service Chiefs one by one of the

necessity for the Base Force.<sup>28</sup> Not until November 1990 did Secretary Cheney direct the Services to implement the Base Force.<sup>29</sup> Selling Powell's vision of the future required a long debate and great effort in consensus building on the part of Powell and his staff.

Additionally, the Joint Staff accomplished much of the effort to shape the future military simultaneously with the development of a national security vision. Although General Powell received a favorable response resulting from his November 1989 briefing to the President<sup>30</sup>, the National Security Strategy Report (NSSR) published in March 1990 reflected only partially the new security environment. It recognized changes in the security environment, yet articulated a strategy not much different from the Cold War strategy.<sup>31</sup> This 1991 NSSR, however, represented a substantial shift in strategic thinking. "More than preceding reports....this one attempted to broaden the definition of national security."<sup>32</sup> It included new military principles, a new political direction, and a strong emphasis on the economy as an element of security strategy. The strategy for the military element of national power in this NSSR was prepared in conjunction with, and based on, much of Powell's strategy, even referring to the Base Force by name.<sup>33</sup> This simultaneous policy and strategy formulation proved advantageous in that military

strategy was aligned with grand strategy. The military and grand strategies, if not comprehensive, were tightly integrated. Although the Base Force was not far-reaching in terms of years in the future, it stands as an example of the military seizing the initiative to shape its future.

A review of the process used by General Powell to produce the January, 1993 NMS reveals weaknesses in long range planning. Although a dramatic change in the military strategy took place, it looked out only to the mid term. This may have resulted from several actions. First, General Powell truncated the ongoing JSR and did not publish a Chairman's Guidance. This left the NMS unanchored. As stated earlier, General Powell was not satisfied with the process; and later MOP 7 was revised to serve his style of action.<sup>34</sup> MOP 7 made the JSR a continuous process and provided for the Chairman's Guidance to be published separately or as an endorsement of the JSR. The purpose of the Chairman's Guidance is to provide a framework for building the NMS and to "serve as a bridge between initial assessments and views developed during the JSR process and the specific process that builds the NMS"<sup>35</sup> The lack of a published CG does not necessarily mean there was a lack of guidance. The Chairman did provide guidance in several forums.<sup>36</sup> If a strategic vision is not documented, however, the door is open for misinterpretation. Lacking

written resolutions or decisions, any consensus that may have been achieved can quickly dissipate. Changes in key personalities, especially the CJCS, can then more easily drive changes in strategy. Additionally, Joint Staff planners apparently gave little thought during this time to a long range strategy for the future.

Moreover, the published NMS was not a complete military strategy. Rather than a strategy addressed to the defense planning community, General Powell recognized the need "for the American people to understand the new strategy in order for them to be willing to provide the funding required to support it. He wanted a 'Parade magazine article' NMS."<sup>37</sup> Thus a simple, clear, unclassified statement directed to the people became the standard for the NMS. But this is only the foundation of the strategy. The real meat of the strategy lies in the Top Secret JSCP, with specific taskings for the CINCs, and Joint Staff Issue Papers prepared for decisions by the Chairman.<sup>38</sup> This distributed form of a strategy can result in misinterpretation by those unfamiliar with all components. The development process for the subsequent national military strategy, however, took on a substantially different form.

### **The Bottom-Up Review**

By the time President Bush's final NSS was published in January

1993, the presidential election had forced a significant redirection of national priorities to domestic issues. Additionally, the new SecDef, Les Aspin, who had previously analyzed military force structure while Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, directed a Bottom-Up Review (BUR) of Defense Needs and Programs shortly after he took office in early 1993. As Secretary Aspin wrote in the introduction to the report, its "underlying premise....was that we needed to reassess all our defense concepts, plans, and programs from the ground up."<sup>39</sup> And, as he testified before the House Armed Services Committee in March 1993, the "Review aims to ensure that U.S. defense programs have a fully developed strategic and analytical base."<sup>40</sup> Since DoD was to develop a force structure and strategy in this manner, the review began absent a Clinton Administration national security strategy. To its credit, however, the final report defined national goals and a strategy to achieve these goals. Additionally, Secretary Aspin published the BUR as a "Defense Strategy" with, as yet, no accompanying NMS. Figure 2 schematically summarizes the methodology for the BUR.

The multi-year defense plan would detail the "forces, programs and defense budgets the United States needs to protect and advance its interests in the post-Cold War world."<sup>41</sup> DoD would develop this plan upon






FIGURE 2 42

conclusion of BUR decisions on force structure, modernization, defense foundations, and policy initiatives.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) led the development of the BUR, meaning the BUR would be accomplished outside the JSPS -- the

established system to develop the national military strategy. Apparently the need of the SecDef to move rapidly on a strategic change in direction forced the use of a system radically different from that established. This had some unfortunate results. OSD was not able to take full advantage of the system that, for many good reasons, had evolved over the years. One valuable tool in the JSPS is the JSR, which was truncated for the BUR, similar to the Base Force process. The BUR based the force structure on relatively generic planning scenarios without specific consideration of the coalition forces projected to be available in each scenario region. Also absent for the BUR was a long range vision which the JSR is designed to produce. Although the Joint Staff wrote and distributed a Long Range Vision Paper in April 1993, it remained in draft form.<sup>43</sup> Long range planning was apparently a low priority in this effort at strategy formulation as well. Additionally, DoD proceeded with the BUR without a published Chairman's Guidance, which could be a significant document for strategy formulation, especially in terms of a long range strategy.

### **The process continues**

The Clinton Administration continues to develop its national security strategy. As of this writing, the Administration has distributed another draft for comment. This delay in publishing complicates an

already difficult military strategy formulation process. The validity of the Chairman's vision remains suspect without clear national military objectives from the National Command Authority (NCA).

In their best efforts to proceed within the JSPS, the Joint Staff is developing the NMS in an unclassified format and in conjunction with the NSS as it is being prepared. Thus, the military strategy will likely be integrated well with the security strategy. This should hold true, as with earlier strategies, for short term planning and mid term programming. The danger, however, lies in long range planning. It is very difficult, as seen in the time it took an aggressive Chairman to sell his Base Force strategy, to reach consensus in the short and mid terms, let alone the long term. OSD and the Joint Staff are working to chart the future and build consensus for a long term plan.

There are several efforts underway to plan for the more distant future. The Joint Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J-7) completed the Future Joint Warfighting Capabilities Study and briefed its results to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) in July 1993. In October 1993 the Joint Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate (J-8) published JPD Volume 4, Future Capabilities, a significant long range planning document called for by the JSPS.

Primarily intended "to provide input into the DPG (Defense Planning Guidance) and the DoD S&T (Science and Technology) strategy, it addresses three major areas: (1) an overall acquisition approach, (2) S&T, and (3) systems acquisition (R&D)."<sup>44</sup> Additionally, the 1994 JSR will consider alternative futures out to 2014 and then assess today's strategy as it impacts on the future. Also, OSD has a Revolution in Military Affairs Senior Steering Group with the Vice CJCS as a member and a working group with several task forces looking out to 2025 to provide input to the JSR.<sup>45</sup> These efforts should guide the military into the next century.

## **Conclusions**

In general, although the JSPS is a viable planning system, military strategy is evolving slowly; both the consensus and the budget processes encourage this incremental progression. What DoD lacks is a vision of the future. But now is the time to look ahead. Although volatile, the present strategic environment does not directly threaten the survival of the U.S., thus the opportunity to develop a strategy for the future.

Specifically, an effective national military strategy depends on a distinct, integrated national security strategy. This is a truism, but it bears stating because its impact on the process of long range military planning is so severe. Without clear policies, effective military strategy

formulation is a questionable undertaking. And, because in the struggle for budgetary support, military security requirements frequently conflict with economic development, the grand strategy must balance all elements of national power -- political, economic, and military -- to be successful.

Second, the security-economic dialectic pressures planners to concentrate on short term programs at the expense of long term planning and programming. Again, this may be stating the obvious. It may also be a natural consequence of a democratic bureaucracy. Long-range programming, nevertheless, requires some measure of sacrifice in the short term. What exacerbates any attempt at short term sacrifice is the absence of a long range vision for the organization.

Third, without a long range strategic vision, strategic planners naturally gravitate to the immediate -- the short and mid term effort. The vision should first come from the NCA; but if it doesn't, then it falls to the CJCS to form a foundation for, and to frame the debate on, the future military strategy. Although not a significantly far-reaching strategy, the development of the Base Force provides a good example of a strategic vision producing results in the short and mid term. Neither the Chairman or the SecDef, however, has published a strategic vision for long range military planning and programming.

Fourth, the NMS has emerged as a short to mid range document designed to sell a strategy to the allocator of resources, the Congress. Although this sounds like a harsh judgement, it is not. It is democracy at work, a means of informing the people. In the United States, the people, embodied in Congress, hold the purse strings. The shortfall in this method though, is that the declared or public strategy tends to be somewhat shallow for reasons of simplicity, salesmanship, and, obviously, security. The two examples studied -- the Base Force and the BUR -- have been only partial strategies. The remainder of the military strategy lies in the JSR, JSCP, JPD, and Joint Staff Issue Papers. This creates an apparent lack of cohesion, making it difficult to sell to Congress.

Finally, although the JSPS has evolved over the years as an effective planning system, integrated long range planning remains weak. Unfortunately, some valuable long range planning requirements were discontinued in the present JSPS as new ones were added. To establish long range planning as a permanent, workable, and thriving component of the JSPS will likely require a cultural change as well as any procedural changes. How can the JSPS better assist the CJCS and his staff in developing the "strategic pull" of which Admiral Jeremiah spoke?

## **Recommendations**

**Delete the requirement for the Long Range Vision Paper and publish the Chairman's Guidance.** Don't allow the CG to be simply an endorsement of the JSR. It should be published in a properly classified format with an unclassified executive summary for public consumption and debate. It should include guidance for short term operational planning, mid term programming, and a long term strategic vision, incorporating what is now in the Long Range Vision Paper, with priorities for future capabilities. The Chairman can then use this document to gain consensus for the NMS.

**Publish a consolidated National Military Strategy in a properly classified format with an unclassified executive summary.** In this way, the NMS can be a complete document sufficient for the needs of the defense planning community. The executive summary can serve a valuable informative purpose before Congress and the people. Like the Chairman's Guidance, the NMS should have short term operational planning guidance, mid term programming guidance, and long range priorities for future capabilities.

**Reinstate the requirement to identify "strategic and force planning and structuring implications and issues and (propose) military strategies**

***for meeting future national security needs."***<sup>46</sup> This was required by Annex G (Long Range Planning Guidance) in MOP 84. Most appropriately, this would be part of the Joint Planning Document. Planning such as this is underway now in the Joint and OSD staffs. To codify it as part of the JSPS will help to ensure its accomplishment and integration with the multiple long range planning efforts in DoD.

***Increase the flexibility and responsiveness of the JSPS .*** In the cases reviewed, the JSPS was partially abandoned. What is needed now is to make it flexible enough to allow significantly compressed time lines when needed. Each step in the system, including CINC and other DoD input, should have a truncated process much like the crisis action planning system of the Joint Staff. This would allow the accommodation of unforeseen changes in strategic guidance or the environment.

Members of the military, Congress, and the Administration want to improve long range national security planning. And, though all are under pressure for short term results, now is the time to upgrade the national military strategy development system for better long range planning. It is not in the best interests of the nation for the military to simply respond to the strategic environment. Rather, it is better to seize this opportunity to shape the military's future. Present long range planning



and programming efforts are moving in the right direction. These recommendations for changes to the JSPS will provide focus for this work and improve the capability to respond to strategic changes.



## END NOTES

1. David Packard, A Quest for Excellence, by the President's Commission on Defense Management. (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1986), xix.
2. Ibid, 31-37.
3. David E. Jeremiah, speech delivered at the U.S. Naval Institute/Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association West '94 Conference, San Diego, January 10, 1994.
4. Joint Chiefs of Staff Pub 1-02: Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, December 1, 1989), 231.
5. Ibid., 244.
6. Michael Howard, et al, Karl von Clausewitz: On War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 88.
7. Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., "A Methodology for Developing a Military Strategy," in Military Strategy: Theory and Application, ed. Arthur F. Lykke, Jr. (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 1993), 3.
8. Constitution of the United States of America, Article 1, Section 8.
9. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957) 253.
10. Gordon Adams, The New Politics of the Defense Budget, (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, February 26, 1992) 22.
11. U.S. Congress, U.S. Public Law 99-433. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense reorganization Act of 1986, Ch. 5, sec. 151, para. (b).
12. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum of Policy No. 84. The

Joint Strategic Planning System (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 1, 1989), 2. Specifically, the JSR "provides the means for the Chairman, in consultation with other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CINCs, to assess the environment, evaluate the threat, and propose the military strategy and force capabilities necessary to support achievement of US national security objectives consistent with policies and priorities established by the Secretary of Defense."

13. Harry E. Rothmann, Forging a New Military Strategy in a Post-Cold War World: A Perspective from the Joint Staff (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, February 26, 1992), 11.

14. Chairman, 12.

15. Ibid., 13.

16. Ibid., 23. Specifically, the requirements for Annex G (Long Range Planning Guidance) read as such: (a) Examines plausible long-range international political, social, economic, technological, and military trends; alternative future scenarios and strategic environments; and threats, challenges, and opportunities having implications for future defense planning. (b) Identifies strategic and force planning and structuring implications and issues and proposes military strategies for meeting future national security needs. (c) Provides a framework, baseline, and guidance to the CINCs for their use in assessing alternative analyses, evaluations, and acquisition strategies.

17. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum of Policy No. 7, The Joint Strategic Planning System (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 17, 1993), 1.

18. Ibid., 1-2. Specifically this revised JSPS issues "the National Military Strategy (NMS) as a stand-alone document, eliminating the National Military Strategy Document (NMSD). Establishes the Joint Planning Document (JPD) to provide a reference for CJCS programming advice in support of the NMS. Establishes a Joint Strategy Review (JSR) as a standing body continuously reviewing the international and domestic

environments for trends and changes that should be incorporated into the strategic thinking of the United States in the long- and mid-terms. Provides for Chairman's Guidance (CG) to be published in two ways: either through formal endorsement of JSR Annual Report recommendation or at anytime as a result of changes in the strategic environment. Redefines the JSR Intelligence Assessment with specific requirements and focus for the long, mid and near term strategic planning time frames. Places more emphasis on long range planning in strategy development."

19. Ibid., I-1.

20. Ibid., II-3.

21. Ibid., IV -3. Specifically, Annex G (Long Range Planning Guidance) is to address "present and future operational capability deficiencies and potential technology exploitation opportunities that require major Science and Technology (S&T) or Systems Acquisition (research and development) efforts in the mid range (FYDP) (Future Years Defense Plan ) and long range (FYDP + 14 years) time frames. Establish a prioritized set of major R&D and S&T objectives addressing the operational deficiencies....above."

22. Ibid, I-5.

23. Ibid, III-1.

24. U.S. Department of the Army, Army Command and Management: Theory and Practice (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, 1993), 14-7.

25. Lorna S. Jaffe, The Development of the Base Force, 1989-1992 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, July, 1993), 13. Specifically, General Powell "had found when he was national security adviser that what the military produced often did not meet policy makers' needs, and he resolved that this would not happen during his tenure as Chairman....He also thought that in the changed strategic and fiscal environment the normal programming and planning process would produce irrelevant recommendations. Therefore he wanted to break out of the PPBS (Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System)

cycle, in which the Services submitted POMs in competition with each other, and instead give them his guidance for programming priorities."

26. Ibid., 11-15.

27. Ibid., 20.

28. Ibid., 39-41.

29. Ibid., 44.

30. Ibid., 18.

31. The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: The White House, August 1991).

32. Don M. Snider, The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, February 24, 1992), 8.

33. Jaffe, 47.

34. Interview with Colonel Harry Rothmann (U.S. Army), Chief of Staff of the Army Chair, National War College, January 13, 1994.

35. Chairman, II-4.

36. Rothmann, Forging a New Military Strategy in a Post-Cold War World: A Perspective from the Joint Staff, 15.

37. Jaffe, 7.

38. Rothmann interview.

39. Les Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, October, 1993), iii.

40. Les Aspin testimony to the House Armed Services Committee,

"Documentation," Comparative Strategy, Vol. 12, No. 3, July-September 1993, 351.

41. Aspin. Report on the Bottom-Up Review, 4.

42. Ibid., xix.

43. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Long Range Vision Paper," Signed by Jonas L. Blank, Jr., Colonel, USAF, Chief, Strategy Division for the Deputy Director for Strategy and Policy, J-5, (Washington, D.C.: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 1, 1993).

44. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Planning Document, FY 1996-2001, Volume 4, Future Capabilities (Overall classification: Secret) (Washington, D.C.: The Joint Chiefs of Staff), 1-2.

45. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Steve Cullen (U.S. Air Force), Strategic Planner, Strategic Concepts Branch, Strategy Division, Joint Staff, J-5, February 10, 1994.

46. Chairman, Memorandum of Policy No. 84, The Joint Strategic Planning System, 23.





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